Fire loss litigation often turns on expert testimony, particularly when physical evidence has been altered by remediation or repair. In those cases, courts are frequently asked to decide whether an expert's inability to inspect an undisturbed scene renders an opinion unreliable as a matter of law. A recent Texas appellate decision, Ghaznavi v. Arby Construction, Inc., provides important guidance on that question and offers a cautionary tale for litigants seeking to resolve causation disputes at the summary judgment stage.
Reversing summary judgment in favor of a residential contractor, the court held that the trial court abused its discretion by excluding the homeowners' causation expert. Although the expert could not personally inspect the precise location where the fire marshal originally identified the fire's origin, he relied on contemporaneous photographs and fire science principles to explain why the physical evidence supported a different conclusion. In doing so, the court reaffirmed a critical distinction in Texas law. Reliability is about methodology and reasoning, and not about whether the expert's conclusion aligns with another investigator's findings.
Factual and Procedural Background
The homeowners hired a contractor to install tile in a corridor adjacent to their garage. At the homeowner's' request, the contractor also repaired a nonfunctioning electrical outlet in the garage by connecting it to the garage door opener through newly installed wiring along the wall and ceiling.
Less than two months later, the home suffered a significant fire that damaged the garage, the corridor behind it, and the roof above those areas. A county fire marshal investigated shortly after the incident and concluded that the fire originated above the ceiling in the corridor behind the garage. His report attributed the fire to faulty wiring and referenced information provided by the homeowner regarding recent electrical work.
The homeowners later retained an electrical engineer to determine the cause of the fire. By the time of his inspection, interior repairs had been completed, although the garage receptacle remained in its original position, After reviewing the fire marshal's report, photographs taken immediately after the fire, and the remaining physical evidence, the engineer concluded that the fire originated at the garage receptacle installed by the contractor. In his opinion, the outlet became overstressed, generated heat over time, and ultimately served as the ignition source before the fire spread into the home.
The contractor objected to the expert's testimony as unreliable and moved for summary judgment. The trial court sustained the objection, excluded the expert's testimony, and granted summary judgment on the basis that the contractor had not performed electrical work in the area where the fire marshal concluded the fire began.
The Legal Framework Governing Expert Reliability
Texas Rule of Evidence 702 permits expert testimony when specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact, but only if the opinion rests on a reliable foundation. Courts evaluating reliability must consider not only whether the expert's methodology is sound, but also whether the data on which the expert relies is itself reliable. Helena Chemical Co. v. Cox, 664 S.W.3d 66 (Tex. 2023). Expert opinions that amount to little more than conclusory assertions or that rely on unfounded assumptions are inadmissible. Id. at 73; Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Tamez, 206 S.W.3d 572, 578 (Tex. 2006). At the same time, Texas law does not require experts to eliminate every conceivable alternative cause. Rather, when plausible competing causes exist, the expert must account for them with reasonable certainty and explain why they do not undermine the proffered opinion. Helena at 80.
The Trial Court's Error in Excluding the Expert
The trial court focused heavily on the expert's admission that he could not inspect the precise area where the fire marshal concluded the fire originated because that area had bene repaired. While acknowledging that this limitation can present challenges in fire investigations, the appellate court made clear that such a limitation is not dispositive.
The expert explained that he relied on photographs taken immediately after the fire, which documented the undisturbed scene. He identified deeper and more extensive charring near the garage receptacle and ceiling joists above it, indicating a longer burn duration in that location. By contrast, he described the charring near the north wall as more superficial, consistent with fire spread rather than origin.
Critically, the expert also addressed why the area behind the north wall appeared heavily damaged despite not being the point of origin. He explained that air flow from a nearby door opening could have supplied oxygen that intensified surface burning in that area without indicating where the fire began. This analysis directly engaged with the fire marshal's conclusion rather than ignoring it.
The appellate court emphasized that the expert did not rely on speculation or assume facts unsupported by the record. Instead, he articulated a coherent analytical process grounded in fire science, photographic evidence, and physical indicators such as char depth and burn patterns.
Reliability Versus Weight of the Evidence
At the heart of the appellate court's decision is a familiar but often blurred distinction. Challenges to an expert's assumptions, interpretations, or ultimate conclusions typically go to the weight of the testimony, not its admissibility. When an expert explains the basis for disagreeing with another investigator and ties that explanation to reliable data, the testimony clears the admissibility threshold.
The court underscored that trial courts may not resolve competing expert opinions under the guide of reliability determinations. Doing so improperly shifts the court from its gatekeeping role to factfinder, particularly at the summary judgment stage where all reasonable inferences must be drawn in favor of the nonmovant.
Summary Judgment Could Not Stand
Once the expert testimony was deemed admissible, the contractor's summary judgment necessarily failed. The expert opinion created a genuine issue of material fact as to causation and whether the contractor's electrical work contributed to the fire. Under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 166a, that fact issue precluded judgment as a matter of law. The appellate court therefore reversed the summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings.
Practical Takeaways for Construction and Fire Loss Litigation
This decision offers several practical lessons for litigants and counsel. First, the inability to inspect an undisturbed fire scene does not automatically render an expert opinion unreliable, particularly when contemporaneous photographs and other reliable data are available. Second, experts must do more than assert disagreement with alternative causation theories. They must explain why the physical evidence supports a different conclusion and address competing explanations with reasonable certainty.
The decision serves as a reminder that causation disputes rooted in competing expert interpretations are rarely appropriate for resolution on summary judgment. When experts meaningfully engage with the evidence and explain their reasoning, credibility determinations belong where Texas law has long placed them- with the jury.
