In a decision of first impression, the California Court of Appeal in RND Contractors, Inc. v. WRSE (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 697, clarified whether a co-defendant may oppose another defendant's motion for summary judgment without having first filed a cross-complaint. The case arose from the collapse of a high school gymnasium during construction, leading to negligence, wrongful death, and premises liability claims against the project participants. The court held that "any adverse party" may oppose another party's motion for summary judgment, even if the Plaintiff does not oppose the motion and there is no cross-complaint filed by the co-defendant opposing summary judgment.
This ruling resolves a novel procedural question which had not been addressed by any Court of Appeal in California to date.
Factual and Procedural Background
The Grossmont Union High School District (the "District") retained an architect to design a new event center at Monte Vista High School and hired a general contractor, Balfour Beatty Construction, LLC ("Balfour Beatty"), to construct the building. RND Contractors, Inc. ("RND") served as the structural steel framing contractor. RND's responsibilities including preparing erection drawings, erection procedures, and bracing plans. Wiseman + Rohy Structural Engineers ("WRSE") were consultants to the architect and acted as the engineer of record for the project. WRSE did not contract directly with the District, Balfour or RND.
Two of RND's employees, Navarro and Muro, were assigned to the project. During construction, a cantilevered steel section failed, resulting in Navarro's death and serious injuries to Muro. The surviving plaintiffs sued Hadley Engineering, American Safety Group, Inc. WRSE, and Balfour, alleging their negligence caused the collapse. In turn, Balfour filed a cross-complaint against RND, contending that RND's subcontract with the District obligated it to defend and indemnify Balfour against Plaintiffs' claims.
Thereafter, WRSE moved for summary judgment, asserting it owed no duty to plaintiffs because its role was limited to design services and the cause of the incident was negligent construction and not its negligent design. In response to the motion, Plaintiffs did not oppose the motion and filed statements of non-opposition. RND and Balfour both opposed WRSE's motion. RND argued that WRSE's design was deficient, which caused or contributed to the collapse. WRSE countered that neither RND nor Balfour had standing to oppose its motion because neither had filed cross-claims against WRSE.
The trial court sided with WRSE after concluding that WRSE met its initial burden for summary judgment under California Code of Civil Procedure section 437c. The court also determined that RND and Balfour lacked standing to oppose the motion by holding that a co-defendant may not oppose another defendant's motion for summary judgment unless there are pending cross-claims between them. Acknowledging that no published precedent had previously addressed the issue, the trial court characterized the issue as "ripe for further appellate work" but nonetheless held WRSE's motion was effectively unopposed and granted summary judgment in its favor.
RND filed an appeal. On appeal, RND contended that the trial court erred in refusing to consider its and Balfour's oppositions to WRSE's motion for summary judgment. According to RND, the court not only should have considered those filings, but also would have denied WRSE's motion based upon the evidence submitted by RND in the opposition demonstrating a triable issue of material fact.
Did RND and Balfour Have Standing to Oppose WRSE's Motion for Summary Judgment?
The central issue was whether RND and Balfour had standing to oppose WRSE's motion in the absence of cross-claims between the parties. However, there was no California state court precedent decisions on this subject. In addition, Federal district courts are split on this issue, but at least one Federal District Court reached the conclusion that a co-defendant without a cross-complaint lacks standing to oppose another defendant's motion for summary judgment. (See, Eckert v. City of Sacramento (E.D. Cal. 2009) 2:07-cv-00825-GEB-GGH, 2009 WL 3211278.) Further, other trial courts in California had reached the same conclusion. (See, Arreola v. Preferred IPA of California (2017) BC629841 (Los Angeles County), 2017 WL 11439854, at *2; Reynolds v. Cookie Cutter Pools, Inc. (2012) 34-2010-00086020 (Sacramento County) 2012 WL 12910743, at *1; Stapleton v. Pacific Const. Group (2018) BC613913 (Los Angeles County) 2018 WL 9490056, at *1; and Buncio v. Ophir Management Services (2019) BC669756 (Los Angeles County) 2019 WL 9595744, at *1-2.)
The court in RND Contractors, Inc. looked at California Code of Civil Procedure section 437c(p)(2), for the language identifying who can oppose a summary motion. This section states as follows:
"A defendant or cross-defendant has met that party's burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action, even if not separately pleaded, cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action. Once the defendant or cross-defendant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff or cross-complainant to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto. The plaintiff or cross-complainant shall not rely upon the allegations or denials of its pleadings to show that a triable issue of material fact exists but, instead, shall set forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto."
WRSE argued that because RND and Balfour were neither a plaintiff nor a cross-complainant, they lacked standing to file an opposition to its motion for summary judgment.
However, the Court of Appeal also looked at language in the California Supreme Court decision of Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, for additional guidance and found that language within the Aguilar decision resolved the issue. The Court of Appeal found that the following language in Aguilar permitted RND and Balfour to oppose WRSE's motion for summary judgment:
"Likewise, any adverse party may oppose the motion, and, 'where appropriate,' must present evidence including 'affidavits, declarations, admissions, answers to interrogatories, depositions, and matters of which judicial notice' must or may 'be taken.' An adverse party who chooses to oppose the motion must be allowed a reasonable opportunity to do so." (Emphasis added.)
Therefore, the Court of Appeal held as follows: "Aguilar thus broadly interpreted section 437c, subdivision (b)(2) as providing that any party may oppose a motion for summary judgment so long as that party is 'adverse' to the moving party." The Court of Appeal went on to note that no California authority has specifically defined "adverse party" in the summary judgment context. However, it indicated that courts have long construed the term broadly to encompass parties whose rights or interests would be affected by the granting of a motion, and in multiparty cases, co-defendants have been treated as adverse where their interests diverge, even absent formal cross-claims, and where their competing interests in the outcome of the litigation are at odds.
In this case, WRSE sought to avoid liability by placing fault on RND's construction activities, while RND argued that WRSE's design deficiencies contributed to the collapse. The parties' interests were therefore directly opposed, rendering them adverse despite the absence of an express cross-claim. Accordingly, the Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court should have considered RND's opposition under the framework set forth in Aguilar since RND and WRSE were "adverse".
Conclusion
The Court of Appeal's ruling in RND Contractors, Inc. v. WRSE establishes that defendants are not barred from opposing a co-defendant's summary judgment motion so long as the parties are adverse, even though no cross-claim has been filed. This is true even where the Plaintiff does not oppose the motion for summary judgment.
For construction litigation practitioners, the case highlights two key takeaways. First, standing to oppose summary judgment is not confined to plaintiffs; co-defendants may oppose when their interests are directly at stake and they are "adverse" to the party filing the motion. Second, while a formal cross-claim is now unnecessary, it may still be prudent to file such a cross-claim to avoid any argument that there is a lack of standing or that the parties are not actually "adverse" to one another. The opinion marks a significant development in California construction law, aligning procedural fairness with substantive accountability and it is anticipated more oppositions to summary judgment will be generated as a result of this ruling.
