In a noteworthy ruling for school districts and educational facilities statewide, the Arizona Supreme Court held that Phoenix Union High School District No. 210 (the "District") did not owe a duty of care to a student who was struck by a vehicle while jaywalking across a public street on his way to school. The decision, Phoenix Union High School District No. 210 v. Hon. Joan M. Sinclair and Christopher Lucero, reaffirms the boundaries of a school's legal responsibility for student safety and narrows the application of the school-student special relationship to situations where the student is under the school's custody and control.
Background of the Case
The case arose from a 2021 incident involving 14-year-old CJ Lucero, a freshman at Betty H. Fairfax High School ("BFHS"), part of the District. On the morning of the incident, CJ was walking to school and decided to jaywalk as he approached the school campus. He was struck by a car and sustained serious, permanent injuries.
At the time, the area of the accident lacked marked crosswalks or school zone signs. There was a dirt lot owned by the City of Phoenix that sat across the street from the school and was frequently used by parents for drop off and pick up. Neither the District nor BFHS instructed parents to use the lot, but BFHS was generally aware that some students crossed the street at unmarked locations as CJ did in this case.
CJ, through his father, sued the District, alleging negligence, gross negligence, and premises liability. He claimed the District knew about the dangerous crossing practices and failed to implement safety measures or warnings. The trial court denied the District's motion for summary judgment, finding that the District may have had a duty given its knowledge of the potential risks. A divided panel of the Arizona Court of Appeals denied the special relief action.
Did the School District Owe a Duty to CJ?
In order to prove his claim, CJ was required to show that the District owed him a legal duty. "Duties are based either on special relationships recognized by common law or on relationships shaped by public policy." Perez v. Circle K Convenience Stores, Inc., 564 P.3d 623, 626 ¶6 (Ariz. 2025).
CJ relied heavily on the decision in Dinsmoor v. City of Phoenix, 251 Ariz. 370, 373 ¶14 (2021) to demonstrate that a special relationship existed between the school and students crossing nearby streets on their way to class. He argued that this special relationship was established by common law and that, "the school-student relationship imposes an affirmative duty on schools to protect students from unreasonable risks of harm." Id. at 373-374.
The District, although acknowledging the duty generally imposed between school and students, argued that the duty does not extend to activities occurring off school grounds and outside the control of school . The Supreme Court agreed with this position.
The Supreme Court's Decision
The Arizona Supreme Court unanimously held that the District owed no legal duty to CJ at the time of the accident because the risk of harm did not arise while CJ was under the school's custody and control.
The court emphasized that while schools owe students a duty to protect against unreasonable risks of harm, that duty arises only when the student is within the scope of the school-student relationship. This is generally limited to the time and geography when the school is supervising and controlling the student. "As with all duties arising from special relationships, the duty applies only to risks that arise within the scope of the relationship." Boisson v. Ariz. Bd. Of Regents, 236 Ariz. 619. 623 ¶10 (App. 2015).
CJ's injuries occurred on a city-owned public street, off school property, and before he entered school grounds. The District neither owned nor controlled the street or its adjacent dirt lot. It also did not instruct students or parents to use the areas outside school ground for drop-off. The court stated, "The risk to CJ arose when he chose to cross 59th Avenue outside of a crosswalk. The risk did not originate from any condition or action of the school itself."
Additionally, the Supreme Court distinguished this case from its prior ruling in Dinsmoor, which allowed for limited exceptions when a known and tangible risk arises while a student is under school supervision but materializes just outside school grounds. The Justices found that no such exception applied here. CJ had not yet entered school supervision when the accident occurred and as the court noted, "Schools do not owe limitless duty to students."
Importantly, the Supreme Court also rejected the argument that the school's duty to provide safe ingress and egress extended to securing or modifying public streets not under the school's control. "Injury generated outside the school property, outside of curricular or extracurricular activities, and from sources unconnected to the school, is not likely to be the school's responsibility." Dinsmoor, 251 Ariz. At 375 ¶22.
Key Takeaways
- The court reaffirmed that schools owe students a duty of care only while students are under their supervision. That duty does not extend to a student merely traveling to school along public streets.
- School districts are not liable for traffic-related injuries occurring off-campus on public roads, even when the school is aware of risky student behavior such as jaywalking.
- Even when schools are aware that certain access patterns (such as drop-offs across busy roads) may pose a danger, there is no legal duty unless the school directs, creates, or controls the conditions that caused the harm.
Conclusion
While tragic in its outcome, Phoenix Union High School District No. 210 v. Hon. Sinclair, affirms the foundational principle that liability must be tethered to a school's actual custody, control, or creation of risk. By drawing a clear boundary around when a school-student special relationship gives rise to a duty of care, the Supreme Court's decision provided essential guidance for public and private schools to navigate their responsibilities for student safety in and around campus.
