With its decision in Medical Marijuana v. Horn, No. 23-365, 2025 U.S. LEXIS 1369 at 11-12 (Apr. 2, 2025), the United States Supreme Court may have cracked open the door to a new wave of civil RICO litigation and it's one that plaintiffs' attorneys are almost certain to walk through.1 By holding that economic losses derivative of personal injury are not categorically excluded from RICO recovery, the Court has effectively loosened the reins on a statute originally crafted to combat organized crime. Now, as a result of the majority's expansive interpretation of "injury to business or property," plaintiffs may increasingly look to RICO as a vehicle for pursuing claims that were previously the domain of tort or employment law.
As stated in the principal dissent, the decision stirs concerns that enterprise litigants will reframe standard personal injury or wrongful termination claims as civil RICO actions, unlocking treble damages, attorney's fees, and a federal forum for resolution of these cases. While the Court emphasized that the statute's safeguards remain intact—chief among them, RICO’s direct-relationship requirement, whereby “foreseeability does not cut it”—it also acknowledged that Congress, not the judiciary, bears responsibility for any overreach. That leaves the plaintiff's bar with a powerful new tool and leaves businesses, employers, and manufacturers on alert.
RICO: From Mafia to Mislabeling
Enacted in 1970, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) was designed to dismantle the economic infrastructure of criminal enterprises. Senate Report No. 91-617 (1969) makes it clear that Congress intended RICO primarily as a tool to combat organized crime's infiltration into legitimate business. The statute makes it unlawful for individuals to engage in a pattern of racketeering activity in connection with an enterprise, and it authorizes both criminal penalties and civil remedies.
Under 18 U.S.C. §1964(c), "any person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962…may sue therefor… and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains…" In other words, plaintiffs may sue and recover for treble damages in addition to costs and attorneys' fees. Over the years, the statute's reach has gradually expanded beyond its original target.
Yet until now, one line has remained relatively firm. Previously, courts generally refused to allow RICO claims where the alleged harm flowed from a personal injury. The so-called "antecedent personal injury bar" was designed to prevent RICO from becoming a backdoor route for litigating bodily injury cases under the rouse of business harm. In Horn, the Supreme Court essentially eliminated that bar, potentially opening the floodgates to a new kind of RICO claim.
The Issue Before the Court In Horn
At issue was whether the "antecedent personal injury bar," a doctrine adopted by several circuits, precludes recovery under civil RICO where the alleged business or property harm flows from a personal injury.
The Court did not address whether unwitting ingestion of THC constitutes a personal injury, whether the term “business” includes all aspects of “employment,” or what “injured in his … property” means for purposes of Section 1964(c).
Factual Background and Procedural History
The plaintiff, Douglas Horn, suffered from chronic pain originating from a prior trucking accident. He began taking a CBD tincture called Dixie-X, which was advertised by its manufacturer, Medical Marijuana, Inc., as non-psychoactive and THC-free. Before taking the substance, Horn did extensive research to ensure that Dixie-X did not contain THC, even contacting company representatives. Despite his due diligence, the product allegedly contained traceable amounts of THC.
A few weeks after he began taking the tincture, Horn was selected for random drug screening by his employer and tested positive for THC. When he declined to participate in the company's substance abuse program, he was terminated from his job.
Horn sued Medical Marijuana, Inc. alleging civil violations of RICO. He claimed that the company's misrepresentations and distribution of mislabeled products amounted to racketeering activity—specifically, mail and wire fraud—that directly caused his job loss and resulting economic harm.
The district court granted summary judgment for Medical Marijuana, holding that Horn's job loss was derivative of a personal injury—namely, his ingestion of THC—and therefore not compensable under RICO. It applied the "antecedent personal injury bar," a doctrine that precludes recovery under RICO for business or property losses stemming from a personal injury.
On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed, finding Horn's employment termination constituted an injury to "business" under the plain language of §1964(c). The court expressly rejected the antecedent personal injury bar, framing it as an overly restrictive interpretation of the statutory text.
The Question Presented
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the narrow but pivotal question: Does civil RICO categorically bar recovery for business or property injuries that derive from personal injury?
Was Horn's Injury Personal or Economic?
Black's Law Dictionary defines personal injury as "an injury done to a person, such as a cut or bruise, a broken limb, or the like as distinguished from his property or reputation." Based on this definition, Medical Marijuana argued that Horn's ingestion of its product constituted a personal injury rather than one economic in nature. Medical Marijuana argued that his ingestion resulted in a ripple effect that later caused him economic injury when he was fired but did not qualify as a direct injury to business or property to qualify for a civil RICO claim.
Horn argued that his injury was economic in nature as it did not occur because of his ingestion of the product, but rather because he relied upon the mail and wire fraud that led him to believe that the product did not contain THC. His reliance on these representations is what he claimed ultimately led to his termination and subsequent economic injury to his business or property.
18 U.S.C. §1964(c)
The statute provides, "Any person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate United States district court and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit, including reasonable attorney fees."
Medical Marijuana asserted that civil RICO does not provide a remedy for economic damages that stemmed from personal injuries. It pointed to relevant precedent which held, "Congress cabined RICO's private cause of action to particular kinds of injury- excluding, for example, personal injuries." RJR Nabisco v. European Community, 579 U.S. 325 (2016) . The defendants further argued, if Congress had intended to include personal injuries in this statute, it would have explicitly done so as it did in the Anti-Terrorism Act, Federal Torts Claim Act, and the Federal Anti-Tampering Act. Finally, Medical Marijuana pointed to the fundamental difference between "injury" and “damages." It argued, "injury means the invasion of a legal right and damages means the loss, hurt, or harm resulting from the injury."
Horn responded that RICO permits recovery for any economic loss directly caused by racketeering activity, regardless of whether a personal injury appears earlier in the causal chain. Defining "injury" as a legal invasion, he argued, still encompasses harms like his caused by fraud.
The Supreme Court's Decision
In a majority opinion authored by Justice Amy Coney Barrett, the Court held that §1964(c) does not impose a categorical bar on civil RICO claims simply because the economic loss stems from a prior personal injury. The key inquiry is whether the plaintiff suffered harm to "business or property," not how that harm came about.
The Court focused on the statute's unambiguous language, "any person injured in his business or property by reason of" a RICO violation may bring suit. It held the statute excludes recovery for personal injury by implication but does not preclude claims where the economic harm derives from such an injury.
Parsing the Statutory Language
The Court carefully analyzed the phrase "injured in his business or property." It found that the ordinary meaning of "injured" is to suffer harm or damage, an understanding supported by both general and legal dictionaries. The Court rejected Medical Marijuana's contention that "injury" must be understood as the invasion of a legal right akin to a tort, noting that such a reading lacks support in the text and would unnecessarily narrow RICO's civil reach.
A Real-World Illustration
To illustrate its point, the Court offered a helpful analogy: a gas station owner who is beaten during a robbery cannot recover under RICO for his pain and suffering, but if his injuries force the closure of the business, he may recover for the economic loss. The cause of the injury—whether physical or otherwise—is not dispositive; what matters is the nature of the harm for which recovery is sought.
Rejecting a Common Law Overlay
In rejecting Medical Marijuana's invitation to impose a common law tort framework onto RICO, the Court reaffirmed its prior holding in Yegiazaryan v. Smagin, 599 U.S. 533 (2023). There, the Court declined to graft common-law rules regarding the situs of injury onto civil RICO, instead favoring a contextual approach grounded in statutory purpose and practical application.
Here, the Court again declined to overlay common law torts principles onto civil RICO. The Court noted that relying on state tort principles in the analysis of plaintiff's complaint would inject confusion and inconsistency, and risk undermining the statute's clarity and national uniformity.
Antitrust Analogies and RICO's Unique Structure
Medical Marijuana also argued that antitrust precedents should guide interpretation of RICO's injury provisions. The Court found this analogy questionable, pointing out that the injury requirements under the Clayton Act and RICO are not interchangeable. In RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community, 579 U.S. 325 (2016), the Court held that RICO's injury requirement stands on its own foundation.
Moreover, the Court rejected Medical Marijuana's textual argument regarding the term "damages," explaining that the phrase "threefold the damages he sustains" simply refers to monetary compensation for harm. Thus, reinforcing that economic loss, regardless of its origin, is recoverable if it affects business or property interests.
Policy Concerns and Congressional Role
Medical Marijuana cautioned that the Court's ruling could invite a wave of civil RICO claims styled around traditional personal injury cases. However, the Court made clear that its job is to interpret the law as written, not to second-guess policy outcomes or rewrite statutory boundaries.
Recognizing these concerns, the Court pointed to several built-in constraints within RICO that prevent overreach:
- Plaintiffs must show a direct connection between the alleged racketeering activity and the injury. Mere foreseeability or indirect causation in not enough;
- RICO requires a "pattern" of racketeering, which is defined as at least two related predicate acts that indicate ongoing or repeated criminal conduct; and
- Not every financial loss qualifies as an injury to "business or property." For instance, the loss of a job or paycheck may not always meet the threshold, depending on the specific circumstances of the case.
Ultimately, the Court emphasized that if the statute's language allows broader access to RICO remedies than Congress intended, the solution lies with Congress, not the judiciary. The Court's role is to adhere to statutory text, not to legislate from the bench.
Implications and Takeaways
The Court's ruling in Medical Marijuana Inc. v. Horn marks a significant turning point in civil RICO jurisprudence. By rejecting the antecedent personal injury bar, the Court expanded the path to recovery for plaintiffs who suffer financial losses due to fraudulent or racketeering activity, even if those losses stem from a prior personal injury. If the plaintiff can establish economic harm to business or property and link it directly to racketeering conduct, a viable RICO claim may exist. The boundaries of what constitutes "business or property" for purposes of §1964(c) remain to be fully fleshed out in future litigation. But the Court's decision ensures that recovery under RICO will not be categorically denied simply because the injury originated in the body rather than the balance sheet.
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1 Authored by Justice Amy Coney Barrett, joined by Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, and Jackson; Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion; Justice Kavanaugh filed a dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito joined.